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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  05-5389
____________
RAMON HERNANDEZ,
                    Appellant
   v.
ROY L. HENDRICKS, Superintendent,
New Jersey State Prison;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
                      Appellees.
____________
On Appeal from United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No.:  02-cv-02636
District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 6, 2008
Before: BARRY, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 17, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ramon Hernandez appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We granted a certificate of appealability to
consider whether the state trial court’s failure to convene a hearing regarding the
prosecutor’s allegedly improper use of peremptory challenges violated Hernandez’s rights
to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The District Court
found that Hernandez’s request for a “Gilmore hearing” was a state law claim not subject
to federal habeas review.  We also asked the parties to address whether Hernandez’s
claim was properly exhausted.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
proceedings below, we will not revisit them here.  When considering habeas petitions,
federal district courts are confined to determining whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).  Insofar as a petitioner challenges the correctness of
an application of state law without alleging a deprivation of any federal right, he may not
obtain habeas relief.  Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982).  Conversely, dismissal of
state constitutional claims does not preclude federal habeas review of analogous federal
constitutional claims.  Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995).
3Here, Hernandez articulated his claim almost entirely as one of state constitutional
law when he requested a Gilmore hearing and referenced the New Jersey Constitution. 
Hernandez also set forth a federal constitutional claim when he argued in his petition for
writ of habeas corpus that “[t]he lower courts[sic] failure to grant a Gilmore hearing in
this matter violated petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by . . .
the Constitution of the United States 14th Amendment.”  Likewise, in his supplemental
habeas petition, Hernandez noted that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), holds that
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on their race violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Hernandez claimed that “the trial judge
did not want to deal with this issue” and denied his request for a hearing “on an issue that
needed direct participation from the prosecutor to make a determination as to whether a
clear and concise reason existed for the peremptory challenges made.”  Hernandez’s
reference to the Equal Protection Clause, coupled with his citation to Batson, is sufficient
to state a federal constitutional claim that is cognizable under the federal habeas statute. 
See, e.g., Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2005).
II.
We turn to the question of exhaustion, which requires a habeas petitioner to “give
the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).  In addition, federal constitutional claims must be
4“fairly presented” to the state courts.  Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).  A
petitioner has “fairly presented” his claim if he presented the same factual and legal basis
for the claim to the state courts in such a way as to place them “on notice that a federal
claim is being asserted.”  McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999). 
After the District Court dismissed Hernandez’s petition, we explained that to exhaust his
claim a petitioner need only demonstrate:  (a) reliance on pertinent federal cases
employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional
analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to
mind a specific right protected by the Constitution, or (d) an allegation of a pattern of
facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.  Nara v. Frank, 488
F.3d 187, 198 (3d Cir. 2007).  Furthermore, a claim is exhausted as long as the state court
had the opportunity to address the federal claim, regardless of whether it addressed it on
the merits or dismissed it on procedural grounds.  Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309
(3d Cir. 1989).
In his supplemental pro se brief before the New Jersey Appellate Division,
Hernandez claimed that the “defendant was hispanic, few hispanics were included in the
jury array, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged every hispanic juror except one; and
the defendant was tried by a jury of ten whites, one black, and one hispanic.”  This
pattern, Hernandez asserted, “established a prime facie [sic] showing that the prosecutor
exercised his challenges because of group bias,” and required remand for a hearing “at
5which time the prosecutor should explain his reasons for peremptorily challenging all of
the hispanic jurors except one.”  Although Hernandez relied heavily upon Gilmore, and 
requested a “Gilmore hearing,” he also cited to Batson at two points in the brief.
We find that Hernandez’s supplemental brief, although far from a model of clarity,
placed the New Jersey courts “on notice that a federal claim [was] being asserted.” 
McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261.   Most notably, the language of Hernandez’s argument
plainly brings to mind the burden-shifting framework of Batson, which requires the
defendant to first make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose,” 476 U.S. at 93-94, after which
the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  Id.  Moreover, the fact pattern
alleged is “well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.”  McCandless, 172
F.3d at 261.  Hernandez’s description of the jury selection is apparently meant to raise a
Batson issue, and he cited Batson in his briefing.  Under the McCandless factors, this was
sufficient to alert the New Jersey courts to Hernandez’s federal equal protection claim.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing
Hernandez’s petition and we will remand the case to permit the District Court to consider
whether Hernandez established a factual basis for his claim and whether he is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing.
